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INDIVIDUAL REPRESENTATION: A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO 
POLITICAL REPRESENTATION
Didier Ruedin
This article presents a new conceptualisation and measure of political representation to complement 
conventional approaches. Individual representation scores place the individual rather than the legisla-ture at 
the centre, providing a fresh perspective on the relationship between inequality and represen-tation. They are 
calculated by comparing ﬁrst the position of the individual with other citizens, and second the position of the 
individual with the legislature. The article outlines how to make sense of indi-vidual representation scores and 
includes an empirical example.
Introduction
Political representation describes the relationship between citizens and a representative
body. Most commonly, this relationship is explored in the context of national legislatures,
national governments or political parties. The relationship between citizens and representa-
tives is usually conceived in one of two ways. On the one hand, dyadic representation is con-
cerned with the link between constituents and their representatives. On the other hand,
collective representation is concerned with the link between all citizens and the representative
body as a whole. This article presents a new way to perceive political representation, with the
aim of complementing the existing approaches. Individual representation places the individual
at the centre rather than the representatives.
Traditionally, the focus of representation studies has been somewhat different in the
United States and Europe. In the United States, the dyadic perspective is used more frequently;
in Europe, the collective perspective seems more common. To a large degree, this difference
reﬂects the electoral systems in place. The dyadic perspective seems appropriate in countries
with majoritarian systems and single-member districts, where there is a direct and clear link
between the constituents and their (usually single) representative. Collective representation
seems appropriate in countries with proportional representation (PR) systems, where the
link between constituents and their (usually multiple) representatives is less clear. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that both perspectives can be—and have been—applied to both con-
texts (Dalton 1985; Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996; Herrera et al. 1992; Miller and Stokes 1963;
Weissberg 1978).
This article complements existing approaches by introducing a new perspective.
Although typically neglected in the literature, the concept of individual representation
deserves attention. Golder and Stramski (2010) mentioned the perspective in a footnote,
but did not consider it for their analysis of representation and policy congruence. In this
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article, I discuss the merits of individual representation, and the ways it can complement exist-
ing approaches. As will be outlined in more detail below, individual representation differs from
dyadic and collective representation by taking a different starting point. For individual rep-
resentation, citizens rather than representatives are taken as the basis. The result is that the
level of representation can be expressed at the individual level, which has advantages for
data analysis and exploring the relationship between inequality among individuals and politi-
cal representation.
Existing approaches mean that we necessarily begin with clearly deﬁned inequalities in
society, such as between men and women, or the voters of a speciﬁc party. Issues where rep-
resentation may be high or low—such as left–right placements or views on immigration—are
examined in a second step. With individual representation scores, it is possible to start with the
issue, and ﬁnd groups who are under- or over-represented in a second step. The advantage in
this case is that groups can be deﬁned in a ﬂexible manner, because representation scores are
calculated as the property of individuals. Membership in multiple groups and related political
behaviour can be expressed easily, such as the level of representation of old women or left-
wing men. This opens up the way for studies on complex expressions of inequality, such as
to calculate interaction effects. For instance, for questions of trust and social cohesion, the
interaction between different forms of under-representation is of central interest. Using indi-
vidual representation scores, it could be examined if say black women are particularly prone
to distrusting government, given their (common) double under-representation. Similarly, indi-
vidual representation may be used to test the question whether individuals who are better rep-
resented also feel better represented—rather than make the assumption. In conjunction with
existing perspectives, individual representation leads to a more comprehensive picture of the
relationship between inequalities and representation than any single approach could provide.
In order to understand the concept of individual representation, it will be necessary to
ﬁrst outline different possible conceptualisations of political representation. By so doing, the
properties of individual representation scores can be understood more readily. The main
part of the article will be on individual representation, which will be illuminated using an
empirical example.
Forms of Political Representation
Political representation can refer to a range of relationships between themasses (citizens)
and thepolitical elite (representatives). Through representation, individuals are given apresence
in governments and positions of decision-making (Pitkin 1967). In principle, free elections give
each citizen equal weight and through representation a voice in decision-making, although not
all groups in society are present in positions of decision-making to the same extent.
Depending on the study and research question, the deﬁnition of the mass and the elite
differs. The mass can be the population of a country, the citizens of a country, the electorate,
actual voters, or voters of a speciﬁc party. The elite can be the representatives in the national
legislature, in government, in a regional assembly, the representatives of a particular district, or
elected representatives of a particular political party. By combining these—and further—
relationships between the mass and the elite, political representation can refer to a wide
range of arrangements. Yet, it is possible to categorise most of the possible relationships
into dyadic and collective representation. In this article, I show that relationships beyond
dyadic and collective representation are conceivable, and I argue that these can indeed be
useful additions.
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The relationship between the mass and the elite can be conceived both in terms of
ideology, issue preferences and agenda priorities (substantive representation), and in terms
of membership in demographically deﬁned groups (descriptive representation). There are
arguments for highlighting both substantive and descriptive representation (Banducci et al.
2004; Childs 2002; Dodson 2006; Mansbridge 1999, 2005; Overby and Cosgrove 1996). As
will become apparent, however, not all possible relationships between the mass and the
elite are equally suited for describing substantive and descriptive representation. This does
not mean that such perspectives are invalid or generally unsuited, but that not all possible
aspects of the relationship between the mass and the elite can be covered by a single
perspective or measure (see also Achen 1977, 1978).
Four representational relationships can be envisaged, covering groups or individuals at
both the elite (representatives) and mass level (citizens). First, an individual citizen can be com-
pared with an individual representative. I refer to this relationship as direct representation.
Second, an individual representative can be compared with citizens as a group. This is
dyadic representation, and studies tend to focus on the representatives rather than the citizens.
Third, a group of representatives can be compared with groups of citizens. This is collective rep-
resentation, and studies again tend to focus on the representatives. Fourth, the difference
between an individual and a group of representatives describes individual representation.
The focus is on the individual.
Dyadic representation is concerned with political representation in a speciﬁc district or
constituency (Eulau and Wahlke 1978; Herrera et al. 1992; Miller and Stokes 1963). The perspec-
tive is of a single representative representing his or her constituents. Usually, studies con-
cerned with dyadic representation examine the role of delegates of a district and to what
extent they can be said to represent their constituents. In this sense, dyadic representation
addresses questions of personal representation (Colomer 2011) as much as representation
by political parties. The focus in these studies is on substantive representation, most commonly
political left and right. Descriptive representation could be studied using the dyadic perspec-
tive if the mode citizen in the constituency is examined. In this case, equivalence could be
covered (e.g., is the representative of a predominantly black district also black?), but it is
impossible to determine distances in studies of descriptive representation. In terms of
measurement, a common approach is to look at the difference between the position of the
representative and the mean or median position of the citizens, or the mean distance to
each citizen in the district (Dalton 1985). In both cases, smaller differences stand for higher
congruence, which is considered better.
Collective representation is concerned with political representation in a speciﬁc repre-
sentative body (Mansbridge 1999; Marsh and Norris 1997; Norris 1985; Weissberg 1978). The
perspective is of representatives as a group representing all citizens. Depending on the
study, the focus can for example be on parliament representing citizens, government repre-
senting voters, or political parties representing voters of the party in question. In each situation,
the focus is on the act of representing rather than who does the representing. Put differently,
the link between constituents and their representatives is no longer central. Indeed, it has been
argued that citizens are more concerned that their interests are represented than who does
this (Weissberg 1978).
With its focus on groups, collective representation is the perspective used for descriptive
representation (Koch and Fulton 2011; Kunovich and Paxton 2005; Norris 1985; Sawer et al.
2006; Schwindt-Bayer 2010). By examining proportions in the population and the representa-
tive body, questions of numerical under-representation can be addressed using collective
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representation. At the same time, collective representation is a useful perspective for substan-
tive representation. It is generally measured by taking the (absolute) difference between the
proportion of a speciﬁc group in the representatives and the same group in the citizens, or by
dividing one by the other. Variations of these approaches cater for multiple groups, or the
ease of interpretation (Ruedin 2011). It is also common to take the proportion of women as a
measure of representation (Krook 2011; Paxton et al. 2007; Schwindt-Bayer 2010), ignoring the
variation in the population. This approach can be defended in the case of women.
Direct representation is concerned with a single representative representing a single
citizen. This perspective works well for substantive representation where distances may be
of interest. For descriptive representation, it is possible to express whether the citizen and
representative belong to the same group, but this may be of limited analytical interest.
Direct representation is the common approach in vote recommendations (such as EU Proﬁ-
ler.eu or Smartvote.ch), but it may be of limited use in social and political sciences where it
may be too speciﬁc for comparative research. The measurement of direct representation is
the (absolute) difference between the position of the citizen and representative in question.
Representation is generally considered to be better where differences are small or absent.
In vote recommendations, the position of parties rather than individual representatives may
be used. In this case, party positions are sometimes set as the mean or median position of
the party’s representatives. Direct representation does not use information on the distribution
of position of representatives, implicitly suggesting that the position of parties as a whole
matters more than the positions of representatives within (compare Colomer 2011).
Whether the focus is on individuals or parties, it is possible to examine multiple domains at
the same time. Usually simple averages (means) of all domains are taken; weights can be
incorporated to emphasise differences in some domains.
Individual Representation
This article is concerned with individual representation. The focus is on how individuals
are represented by a representative body. The perspective of individual representation can be
applied to many situations, including citizens being represented by parliament, or voters being
represented by a particular party. It contrasts with collective representation where the position
of citizens and representatives is combined to compare midpoints. In existing studies of
political representation, the role of the median voter is often highlighted. The position of the
median voter cannot be defeated in elections, and is therefore particularly relevant to political
parties (Black 1948; Downs 1957). Comparisons between the median voter and the government
are common to examine whether the representatives are in line with those represented (and to
what extent). According to political theory, however, all voices should count the same (Verba
2003), and responsiveness should therefore be to all citizens, not just the median voter.
The perspective of individual representation maintains information on the position of
individuals. Speciﬁcally, the outlined approach considers the position of citizens vis-a`-vis
other citizens in society. At the same time, the level of representation is expressed as the prop-
erty of individuals rather than groups they belong to. This has advantages for data analysis,
and makes it possible to address multiple group membership, such as by calculating inter-
action effects. As dyadic representation, individual representation is more suited for substan-
tive representation where distances are examined. In both cases, equivalence with the mode
position could be used, but this does not offer an intuitive way to examine descriptive
representation.
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The approach of individual representation is based on a thought experiment of sequen-
tial comparison: ﬁrst the position of an individual citizen is compared with the position of all
other citizens, and second his or her position is compared with those of all the representatives.
Put differently, the intuition is ﬁrst to determine howmarginal the position of an individual is in
a given society. In a second step, the position of the citizen is compared with the representa-
tives, to determine how marginal this position would be among representatives. Based on
absolute values, these measures of marginality determine the mean of the distances to all
other individuals. The comparison with other citizens is necessary so that individual represen-
tation scores do not simply report the position of the citizen. Assuming that the mean of the
representatives is somewhat central, simply subtracting the position of each citizen from the
mean position of the representatives does not yield signiﬁcant information. Instead, individual
representation scores are comparing the marginality of the citizen in the population with the
marginality of the citizen among representatives. As other approaches to political represen-
tation, individual representation scores assume that representation is better where Euclidean
distances between the individual and the representative are smaller. This is the case, because
higher congruence is regarded as normatively preferable.
More formally, individual representation scores (Vk) consists of two components: themar-
ginality of the individual among citizens (MZ,k), and the marginality of the individual among
representatives (MR,k): Vk ¼ MZ,k 2 MR,k. For every citizen (Zk), the distance between him or
herself to every other citizen (Zi) is calculated. This gives a measure of how marginal the indi-
vidual’s position is in society: MZ,k = 1n− 1
∑
Zk − Zi| |, where n denotes the number of citizens.
In a similar fashion, the distance between the individual (Zk) and all the representatives (Ri) is
calculated: mR,k = 1M
∑
Zk − Ri| |, with m denoting the number of representatives. The theoreti-
cally possible values range from 21 to 1. The relationship between the two components
illuminates the representation of the individual. If MZ,k ¼ MR,k, then the individual is equally
marginal among the population and the representatives. Following theories of representation
(Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995), this is considered the ideal. It describes the situation where a
dominant position among citizens is also a dominant position in the legislative, and where
a marginal position among citizens does not carry much weight among representatives. If
MZ,k , MR,k, the individual is under-represented. Put differently, the individual is closer to
other citizens than to the representatives. This may happen when the position of the individual
is commonplace among citizens but has no correspondence among representatives.
Conversely, an individual can be over-represented, where his or her position is closer to the
representatives than to other citizens. This may happen if there are relatively many represen-
tatives sharing the position of an individual, but relatively few citizens do so. MZ,k/MR,k can
provide an additional indication of the magnitude of such under- or over-representation.
This ratio is 1 if the distance between the individual and the representatives is equal.
An extreme example can be used to make the difference between individual
representation and mean-based approaches apparent. Let the distribution for citizens
resemble a u-curve and that of the representation an n-curve (Figure 1). A citizen on the
very left is not marginal compared with the other citizens, but he or she is marginal compared
with the representatives. Individual representation scores indicate under-representation for
citizens at the margins; a mean-based approach will not pick this up.
The use of representation scores at the individual level makes possible micro-level ana-
lyses. Rather than treating representation as a property of a predeﬁned group, representation
is regarded as an individual affair. Consequently, sophisticated analyses with individual-level
data are feasible, examining the link between inequality and representation from a new
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angle. This is the case, because using individual representation scores it becomes possible to
identify groups in non-political dimensions and consider multiple group membership
simultaneously. To do so, it is not necessary to have data on group membership for the
representatives, such as the age of representatives. Such data are necessary to determine
the collective representation of groups, for example, but data availability is often a limitation
for studies using collective representation. Like other measures of political representation,
individual representation scores are sensitive to small N and missing data on the base
variable—such as left–right positions. This may affect particularly representative bodies
where candidate surveys often fail to provide full coverage.
As indicated, individual representation scores are different from a comparison involving
mean positions of the citizens and representatives. If the distributions of citizens and represen-
tatives are similar, the comparison of mean positions carries some information. Speciﬁcally, we
can tell whether those left or right of the mean are over-represented, but no ﬁner distinctions
are possible. In this case we also need a deﬁnition of what we mean by ‘being similar’. A crude
approach may be offered by the AJUS system, which classiﬁes the shape of distributions
(Galtung 1969). By contrast, individual representation scores compare the distributions
explicitly and therefore can circumvent conceptual issues of how to determine whether two
distributions are similar.
Individual representation scores are complementary to considerations of dyadic and
collective representation. This is the case because individual representation scores are in
FIGURE 1
Individual representation and mean positions
Notes: Hypothetical distribution of issue positions of citizens (top) and representatives
(bottom); citizens and representatives with equal mean position; individual
representation scores will indicate different levels of representation for individuals,
particularly under-representation at the margins; mean-based approaches do not pick up
differences.
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most cases unsuitable for direct comparisons between countries, although within a country,
new nuances can be explored. It is possible to compare the level of individual representation
for speciﬁc groups, such as by comparing the mean of individual representation scores for a
group. Where individual representation scores differ from the mean, it is possible to
argue that the political process has made individuals marginal by not reﬂecting their position
in the representative body. The intuition here is that the political process can aggravate
marginal positions, as they exist in the population. For example, using individual represen-
tation scores, we can address the interplay of turnout inequality, differences in education,
and political interest at the same time—examining whether the combination of these
factors has particular consequences. Similarly, different demographic groups can be
addressed jointly.
Example
In this section, I use an example to illustrate the theoretical considerations outlined
above. Associations between individual representation scores and individual-level variables
are explored using three hypotheses. The example is included to illustrate that the perspective
of individual representation is feasible and that it may be relevant for explaining empirical
realities. No doubt, these explorative results can be improved by explicit theory and better
operationalisation of the concepts.
The ﬁrst hypothesis concerns political behaviour. It can be expected that individuals
behave in a way conducive to higher representation. Without specifying the exact mechanism,
it can be expected that those with more education, of a higher class, and with more interest in
politics are over-represented. The intuition is that the political behaviour of members of these
groups is such that their interests are represented to a greater degree (Bartels 2009; Gilens
2005; Mayer 2011). In a similar vein, it can be expected that non-voting is a non-random
issue (bias), reﬂecting inequalities in society (Teixeira 1987; Wolﬁnger and Rosenstone 1980).
H1: Individuals with more education and with more interest in politics are over-represented.
The second hypothesis concerns demographically deﬁned groups. It can be expected
that members of demographically deﬁned groups are over-represented in policy domains
that directly affect them. This is the case because they have greater incentives to defend
their particularised interests. Relevant groups may include minority and language groups,
regional groups, but also cover gender/sex, and age. However, the existence of substantive
group interests in these dimensions can be questioned. The political dominance of certain
groups in society more generally means that we can expect these groups to be over-
represented (Converse and Pierce 1986; Davis et al. 2011; Norris 2004).
H2: Older individuals and men are over-represented.
The third hypothesis concerns the outcome of individual over-representation. It can be
expected that individuals who are over-represented have greater trust in key institutions, such
as parliament, government and the police (Blondel et al. 1997; Mansbridge 1999, 2008).
This may also be reﬂected in higher levels of generalised trust.
H3: Individuals with higher levels of individual representation trust the police and government
more.
The empirical example is based on the 2007 Swiss Election Studies, which includes a part
on citizens and a matching candidate survey. The data cover both Swiss chambers, the Council
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of States and the National Council. The elected members of two chambers will be covered
separately. The example covers representation on a generic left–right scale, which is based
on self-placement (1 to 11). Other dimensions, or the coverage of agenda priorities, are also
possible with the data in question, and will be covered in future research. The data on the
representatives are somewhat patchy, with a response rate of 63% for the National Council
and 50% for the Council of States. There is a clear response bias in the data used, and this
article uses a party weight to address some of the issues. The substantive results may still
be inaccurate despite the weight used, and that is because of data limitations. For illustrative
purposes, however, the data are suitable.
The left–right distribution of the citizens gives a typical picture, found in many Western
societies. Many individuals place themselves in the centre. For Switzerland, the mean position
is 6.23. In contrast to the citizens, there is no peak at the median position in the Council of
States. It is a small chamber, so the histogram is more rugged. More noticeable is the
absence of representatives at the far right. The mean position is 5.97. In the National
Council, in contrast, a clear skew to the right can be observed. The mean position is 6.66.
The marginality of citizens is as expected from a unimodal distribution: the average
distance to other citizens is larger for those at the margins. The same is true for the
assumed marginality among members of parliament, with perhaps the outlined skew being
visible to some extent. For the generic left–right scale, citizens on the right are under-
FIGURE 2
Left–right distributions in Switzerland
Notes: Left-right distributions of the Swiss citizens, the representatives in the Council of
States, and the representatives in the National Council.
Source: Swiss Election Studies 2007; N ¼ 4106 for the citizens, N ¼ 22 for the Council of
States, and N ¼ 123 for the National Council; party weights are used for the two
chambers of parliament.
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represented by the Council of States; citizens on the right are over-represented by the National
Council. For example, an individual on the far left (position 1 on the x-axis, Figure 3) is over-
represented by the Council of States, indicated by the positive value of individual represen-
tation scores (y-axis). The same individual is under-represented by the National Council,
indicated by the negative value of the individual representation score.
Including the two chambers in the example is interesting because whilst the mean
of Council of States corresponds to the citizen mean, the mean of the National Council is
located to the right of the citizen mean. As is generally the case with individual represen-
tation scores, there are correlations between the individual scores and placement in the
base variable, in this case generic left–right placements. This relationship is not necessarily
of the nature that predicting left–right positions would help predicting individual rep-
resentation scores. This is the case because the order of values need not correspond.
The individual representation scores in the National Council make this visible (Figure 3).
There is a one-way link from the base variable—left–right placements—to the individual
representation scores, but from individual representation scores it is not necessarily
possible to recreate left–right positions. The link between the base variable and individual
representation scores requires knowledge of the distributions of the citizens and
representatives.
FIGURE 3
Individual representation in two chambers
Notes: Individual representation scores (IRS) in the Council of States (top) and the National
Council (bottom). Given are the representation scores for each position on the left–right
scale of the citizens (x-axis). The distance above the horizontal axis indicates the degree
of over-representation for individuals with a given left–right placement; the distance
below the horizontal axis indicates under-representation for individuals with a given
left–right placement. The number of citizens with a particular left–right placement is not
visible in these graphs (see Figure 2 instead).
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In the following paragraphs, representation at the individual level is examined to
demonstrate the usefulness of the concept. The ﬁrst hypothesis outlined stipulates an associ-
ation between education and interest in politics on the one hand, and individual represen-
tation scores on the other. Table 1 also includes other variables that can be thought to
affect individual political behaviour in a similar manner. Most of these bivariate associations
are statistically signiﬁcant. Individuals with more education and those with more interest in
politics tend to be over-represented on the left–right scale. Substantively, however, the
associations are not strong, and statistically the correlation between education and represen-
tation in the National Council is not signiﬁcant. This suggests that the groups identiﬁed here
are not homogeneous in terms of individual representation scores.
Table 1 suggests that individuals are better represented on the left–right scale if they are
better educated, have more interest in politics, are politically involved, discuss politics with
friends and family, and are knowledgeable about politics. The associations can also be
found for different forms of political participation than the donating money listed in the
table. Individuals who ﬁnd it easier to make a vote choice tend to be better represented,
but only by the National Council. By contrast, those who have mixed feelings about the
vote choice are under-represented by the National Council, suggesting that mixed feelings
may be an indicator of political behaviour that is not conducive to higher representation on
the left–right scale.
Not shown in Table 1 is the association for voting frequency. Individuals who vote more
frequently are over-represented for both chambers (p , 0.05). Moreover, individuals with
post-materialist values—as measured by the Inglehart Index (Inglehart 1971)—are over-
represented by the Council of States (p , 0.00), but materialists are not signiﬁcantly over-
represented by the National Council.
The second hypothesis examines demographically deﬁned groups. Looking at represen-
tation on the generic left–right scale, the only groups who can be expected to be over-rep-
resented are those who dominate political life generally: older individuals and men. Table 2
includes a number of other possibilities, but there is no clear pattern. If anything, it appears
that older individuals are under-represented by the Council of States; women appear to be
TABLE 1
Education, political behaviour and individual representation
Variable
Individual Representation
Council of States National Council
Education 0.23 ∗ 0.02 ∗
ISCO-88 (‘class’) p , 0.001 p , 0.001
Income (relative) 0.03 + (0.01)
Interest in politics 0.09 ∗ 0.10 ∗
Voted in previous election D ¼ 0.02 + D ¼ 0.07 +
Political activities: gave money 0.09 ∗ 0.04 ∗
Discuss politics with friends and family 0.11 ∗ 0.04 ∗
Difficult to make vote choice (0.02) 0.13 ∗
Mixed feelings when making vote choice 0.04 + 20.14 ∗
Political knowledge 0.09 ∗ 0.07 ∗
Notes: Given in this table are correlation coefficients, or significance levels for categorical
variables, and differences in means (D) for binary variables. ∗ p , 0.01, + p,0.05 coefficients in
brackets are not statistically significant (p.0.1).
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under-represented by the National Council. The rural–urban divide may be signiﬁcant, with
rural citizens over-represented in both chambers. There are no statistically signiﬁcant associ-
ations for being foreign-born, or married.
The third hypothesis is concerned with the consequences of individual representation. It
stipulates that higher levels of representation, including over-representation, are associated
with higher levels of trust in key institutions. This pattern of association can be found for
the National Council, but the opposite is the case for the Council of States. Individuals who
are better represented by the National Council are more trusting of parliament, political
parties or the police. By contrast, individuals who are better represented by the Council of
States are less trusting of these key institutions (Table 3).
The picture is different if we examine generalised trust. Individuals who are better rep-
resented by the Council of States are more trusting, while those better represented by the
National Council are more likely to agree that one cannot be careful enough when dealing
with others in society.
Not shown in Tables 1 to 3 is that individuals who feel attached to their local community,
their region, their language region, or the country in general are better represented by the
National Council. By contrast, those who feel attached to Europe are better represented by
the Council of States.
Most of the variables identiﬁed as signiﬁcant in the bivariate analysis remain signiﬁcant
in a multivariate analysis (OLS), combining variables from Tables 1 and 2. In contrast to the
bivariate analyses above, discussing politics with friends and family, and actual political knowl-
edge do not appear to be signiﬁcant for individual representation on the generic left–right
TABLE 2
Age and gender and individual representation
Variable
Individual Representation
Council of States National Council
Sex (female) (p . 0.1) D¼ 20.08 ∗
Age 20.19 ∗ 0.04 ∗
Foreign-born (p . 0.1) (p . 0.1)
Married (p . 0.1) (p . 0.1)
Size of municipality (large) 20.10 ∗ 0.04 +
Rural D ¼ 0.01 ∗ D ¼ 0.04 +
Notes: Given in this table are correlation coefficients for continuous variables, significance levels
for categorical variables, and differences in means (D) for binary variables where significant. ∗ p ,
0.01, + p,0.05, coefficients in brackets are not statistically significant (p.0.1).
TABLE 3
Individual representation and trust
Variable
Individual Representation
Council of States National Council
Trust in parliament 20.04 ∗ 0.13 ∗
Trust in political parties 20.04 ∗ 0.14 ∗
Trust in police 20.10 ∗ 0.09 ∗
Notes: Given in this table are correlation coefficients. ∗ p , 0.01.
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scale. Age has a signiﬁcant coefﬁcient for the Council of States only, whilst education is a
signiﬁcant albeit substantively probably negligent variable for both chambers.
Multivariate analysis can also be applied to the third hypothesis, which examines the
inﬂuence of individual representation on trust. The patterns for trust in key institutions
reﬂect the ﬁndings of the bivariate analysis: better representation by the National Council is
associated with higher levels of trust in key institutions. For the Council of States, the opposite
association can be found: individuals who are under-represented by the Council of States trust
key institutions more. The results for generalised trust, by contrast, are different from the
pattern outlined above. Once controlling for other covariates (age, education, sex), higher
levels of individual representation in both chambers are associated with higher levels of gen-
eralised trust. In all instances, the substantive impact of individual representation is signiﬁcant.
The empirical example suggests that the two chambers in Switzerland represent differ-
ent groups of society on the left–right scale in a particular way. With one chamber being close
to the citizen mean and the other right-leaning, different groups are represented differently by
the two chambers. While the way this translates into trust in key institutions varies, higher
levels of individual representation in both chambers are associated with higher levels of
generalised trust.
Conclusion
This article has introduced a new way to conceptualise political representation. Individ-
ual representation scores compare the position of individuals vis-a`-vis other citizens, and their
position vis-a`-vis representatives. By approaching political representation this way, it is poss-
ible to calculate representation scores for individuals. This way it becomes possible to
address new questions of representation that are inaccessible with conventional approaches
of dyadic and collective representation. Individual representation, however, is not in itself
preferable to other approaches of political representation: it is a complement to existing
perspectives, opening the possibility for addressing new questions, or old questions from a
new perspective.
In contrast to conventional approaches, using individual representation scores we can
start with an issue domain in which to examine political representation. For example, we
can look at representation on a left–right scale, or on attitudes toward environmental protec-
tion. The groups that are under-represented can be deﬁned in a ﬂexible manner, because
representation scores are calculated as the property of individuals. This way, multiple group
membership can be addressed, opening up the way for studies addressing complex
expressions of inequality. Similarly, individual representation scores may be used to test the
question whether individuals who are better represented also feel better represented. It is
commonly held that this is the case (Norris 2004), but using individual representation scores
this assumption can be tested statistically. The empirical example suggests that individual
representation and generalised trust are associated, further supporting the position that
objective and subjective levels of political representation may be linked.
While this article has focused on the individual representation of citizens, it is possible to
reverse the perspective and look at individual representatives. This way, the question whether
the position of a representative is in line with the population appears in a new light. Speciﬁ-
cally, individual representation scores give weight to less common positions among the
citizens which also deserve representation. In this sense, we can separate party politics (and
the concern for the median voter) from representation where every citizen has a right to be
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heard. At the same time, individual representation scores take into consideration the distri-
butions of the citizens and representatives, and marginal voices are not over-emphasised.
The empirical example included in this article for purposes of illustration could
demonstrate the usefulness of individual representation as a complement to existing
approaches. Individual representation is suitable for issue positions as examined in this
article, but may also be applied to agenda priorities, which can be treated the same
way. In this sense, individual representation scores are a useful way to examine inequalities
in political representation.
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